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ESSAY
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF
ROPER’S DILEMMA FOR ADOLESCENT
HEALTH LAW?
Jennifer Rosato
I. INTRODUCTION
Adolescents engage in adult activities: they have sex,1 they
sext each other,2 they get pregnant,3 they get abortions,4 and they
 Dean and Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I
would like to acknowledge the hard work of my research assistants David
Stock and Kehinde Durowade, and my administrative assistant Tita Kaus.
Thanks to Professor Juan Perea for thoughtfully reading an earlier version of
the Essay and his constant support. Additional thanks to John Austin, Ben
Carlson, and the library staff for their able assistance. I am particularly
grateful to Karen Porter and Brooklyn Law School for giving me the chance
to present at the Adolescents in Society Symposium, and submit this Essay to
the Journal of Law and Policy. Finally, thanks to the editorial staff of the
Journal for their accommodations and helpful comments, which improved the
piece.
1
See, e.g., Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health,
IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2011 [hereinafter
Facts], available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf. Like
adults, teens also get sexually transmitted diseases. See STDs in Adolescents
and Young Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats09/adol.htm (last updated Nov. 22, 2010).
2
See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, A Lawyer, Some Teens, and a Fight over
‘Sexting,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A17; Riva Richmond, Sexting May
Place Teens at Legal Risk, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009,
12:00 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/sexting-mayplace-teens-at-legal-risk.
3
See GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, BIRTHS AND
ABORTIONS: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS AND TRENDS BY RACE AND
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refuse life-sustaining treatment (among a myriad of adult
5
activities). But just because they do engage in these activities
does not mean that they should. Courts, psychologists, and legal
academics have grappled with one of the overarching questions
addressed by the Adolescents in Society Symposium: to what
extent should law and policy treat teenagers differently from
adults?
This question cannot be answered without first understanding
the underlying bases for treating them differently. One basis is
the “commonsense reality”6 that children are different than
adults. In the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the majority relied on “the settled
understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are
universal”7 in reaching its conclusion that age should be
considered a factor in the determination whether a suspect is in
custody for purposes of providing Miranda warnings.
Specifically, the Court pointed to the “objective conclusions . . .
that children are more susceptible to influence” and “outside
pressures.”8
ETHNICITY (2010) [hereinafter U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES], available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPtrends.pdf; see also Facts, supra note
1 (citing statistics that each year almost 750,000 U.S. women aged fifteen to
nineteen become pregnant, and that in 2006 that number represented seventytwo women per 1,000).
4
U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, supra note 3.
5
See cases discussed in Jennifer Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy:
Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 4–8 (1996) [hereinafter Rosato, The
Ultimate Test of Autonomy] (describing instances in which minors refused
medical treatment). See generally Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in
Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and Behavioral Science, 16
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 55, 58 (2007) [hereinafter
Steinberger, Risk Taking] (“More than 90% of all American high school
students have had sex, drug, and driver education in their schools, yet large
proportions of them still have unsafe sex, binge drink, smoke cigarettes, and
drive recklessly (often more than one of these at the same time.”)).
6
This term was used by the majority in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131
S. Ct. 2394, 2398 (2011).
7
Id. at 2403–04.
8
Id.
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Recent neuroscience research, or “brain science,” offers
another basis for treating adolescents differently. These findings
support the “commonsense reality” that adolescents are
unpredictable, reckless, and impulsive. This research has
identified a number of significant changes in the brain that occur
through adolescence and into the mid-twenties. Those welldocumented changes include decrease in the grey matter in the
brain; increase in the white matter in the prefrontal regions of
the brain; changes in the numbers and distribution of dopamine
receptors (“dopaminergic activity”); and more connections
9
among different areas of the brain.
Although teens’ behavior is consistent with the neurological
changes documented in this research, some teenagers are capable
of making some decisions, especially as they approach the age
of majority.10 The vexing question now facing advocates for
children’s rights is how to use this neuroscience literature (if at
all) in guiding public policy and supporting greater autonomy for
adolescents.11
This Essay addresses how this literature should inform the
law relating to health care decisions that need to be made by or
for adolescents—from birth control to refusal of life-sustaining

9

See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain
Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742–43
(2009) [hereinafter Steinberg, Public Policy]; see also Laurence Steinberg,
Commentary: A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain
Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161 (2010). See generally
DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN
PREGNANCY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS (2005),
available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/BRAIN.pdf
(describing how advances in neuroscience and imaging are altering scientific
perceptions of adolescent cognition).
10
See Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 744; Laurence Steinberg
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion,
the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg, Flip-Flop]; see also
studies cited infra Part III.
11
See Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 745–48; Steinberg, FlipFlop, supra note 10, at 592–93.
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treatment.12 Recent cases integrating the neuroscience literature,
primarily in the criminal law context, have embraced the view
of adolescents as vulnerable, incapable of considering long-term
consequences, and in need of protection.13 This view creates a
dilemma for those policymakers and advocates, like myself, who
consider adolescents mature or “adult-like” outside of the
context of these criminal law cases. This dilemma is not simply
an abstract one. It may affect adolescents’ ability to participate
in decisions as important as whether they should be able to get
the Human Papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccine;14 decline genetic
15
testing for late-onset diseases; obtain treatment for mental
12

I addressed the issue of health care decision making by adolescents and
the relevance of the existing evidence on capacity in Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s
Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in
Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2002) [hereinafter
Rosato, Let’s Get Real]. Other authors who have written thoughtfully on this
issue include Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for
Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409 (2002)
[hereinafter Hartman, Coming of Age], and Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose
Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Health Care Decision-Making, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251 (2005) [hereinafter Mutcherson, Whose
Body].
13
See infra Part II.
14
See, e.g., Carol A. Ford et al., Increasing Adolescent Vaccination:
Barriers and Strategies in the Context of Policy, Legal, and Financial Issues,
44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 568, 570 (2009); Abigail English et al., Legal
Basis of Consent for Health Care and Vaccination for Adolescents, 121
PEDIATRICS (SUPPLEMENT 1) S85, S87 (2008); Ruth M. Farrell & Ellen S.
Rome, Adolescents’ Access and Consent to the Human Papillomavirus
Vaccine: A Critical Aspect for Immunization Success, 120 PEDIATRICS 434,
435 (2007). The HPV vaccine prevents the onset of many cervical cancers
caused by the human papillomavirus. See Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine, Recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 56 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1256, 1256 (2007).
15
Late-onset diseases are those that would arise during adulthood, such
as breast cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. See Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics,
Points to Consider: Ethical Legal and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic
Testing in Children and Adolescents, 57 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1233, 1233
(1995). See generally Rosamond Rhodes, Why Test Children for Adult-Onset
Genetic Diseases?, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 609 (2006) (arguing that
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health problems;16 consent to participation in research trials;17 or
18
elect treatment to change gender identity.
This Essay grapples with this problem in the context of health
care decision making by adolescents and concludes that core values
underlying public policies, not science, ultimately will help resolve
this dilemma.19 First, the Essay summarizes the existing law related
to health care decision making, which (with few exceptions)
considers the adolescent as a child, incapable of making these
decisions on his or her own. Second, the Essay discusses what
effect the neuroscience literature should have on the development
of this area of law. Third, the Essay advocates for the adoption of
a “contextual capacity” determination, which would allow some
mature minors to make health care decisions in areas justified by
compelling public policies. These policies will allow a more
principled and nuanced doctrine to develop that respects the
capacity and dignity of these minors as science continues to
“inform,” but not “dictate,” public policy in this area.20
consensus against predictive testing of children for adult onset genetic
conditions is not justified).
16
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West Supp. 2011)
(allowing mature minors twelve years and older to consent to outpatient
treatment).
17
See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE ETHICAL
CONDUCT OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN (Marilyn J. Field &
Richard E. Behrman eds., 2004); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Word from the
Academies: A Primer for Legal Policy Analysis Regarding Adolescent
Research Participation, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151 (2006)
[hereinafter Hartman, Word from the Academies] (both advocating greater
participation by adolescents in research).
18
See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Comment, Transgender Youth, Adolescent
Decisionmaking, and Roper v. Simmons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 725, 725
(2009); see also Cara D. Watts, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor
Have a Right to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 223 (2005).
19
Other commentators have recognized this dilemma. See Kimberly M.
Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of
Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal
Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 927–99 (2006) [hereinafter Mutcherson,
Minor Discrepancies]; see also Carroll, supra note 18, at 726–29.
20
Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 746.
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II. THE ROPER DECISION POSES THE DILEMMA
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has
concluded that juveniles differ from adults and therefore should
be treated differently. Most notably, in Roper v. Simmons, the
Court concluded that imposing the death penalty on juveniles
was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.21
Prior to this decision, the Court had permitted execution of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.22 In reaching its conclusion that
imposing the death penalty on any person under eighteen was
unconstitutional, the Court relied on a number of authorities:
precedent prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons,
the record of states that had abolished the death penalty for
juveniles, international norms prohibiting the juvenile death
23
penalty, and the differences between adults and juveniles.
The Court identified three areas of difference between
juveniles and adults that justified the differential treatment. First,
their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility
leads to greater recklessness and more impulsivity than adults.24
Second, they are more vulnerable and subject to pressures
(particularly peer pressure).25 Third, the character of the juvenile
is not yet well-formed.26 The Roper Court referred to
neuroscience research in reaching its conclusion that juveniles
were different from adults. The Court, drawing upon what “any
parent knows and . . . the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm,” found that “[a]
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .”27
This neuroscience research was relied upon even more

21

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
Id. at 562.
23
Id. at 563–78.
24
Id. at 569.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 570.
27
Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 367 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22
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explicitly in Graham v. Florida,28 in which the Court held that
imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile who had
not committed homicide was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.29 Reinforcing Roper’s conclusions regarding
juvenile incompetence, the Graham Court stated, “developments
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds.”30 Most recently,
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court acknowledged that
“social science and cognitive science authorities” supported its
conclusion to consider age in the Miranda custody analysis,
although the acknowledgment was not necessary to the Court’s
disposition.31
Roper and its progeny have created a dilemma: can
adolescents be considered immature for some purposes, yet
mature for others? This dilemma was highlighted by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Roper, in which he pointed out that the
American Psychological Association (“APA”) had taken what he
perceived to be the “opposite position” in cases involving
abortion rights: in that context, the APA, in its amicus brief,
provided scientific evidence that persons under eighteen are
32
capable of making decisions regarding abortion. Justice Scalia
admonished the majority for “picking and choosing the studies
that support its position.”33
Justice Scalia’s perspective underscores the vexing and
important dilemma posed by the Roper decision: considering the
brain science research, is it possible under the law to consider
children incapable for some purposes—such as punishment under
the criminal law—and capable for others—such as medical
decision making?
Scholars and policymakers who have consistently advocated
for greater autonomy for adolescents making health care

28
29
30
31
32
33

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2030.
Id. at 2026.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 n.5 (2011).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (alteration in original).
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decisions34 should be more than a bit concerned about the
implications of Roper and its progeny. Although it is
encouraging that the Court appears to be integrating scientific
literature into its decisions in a more thoughtful way,35 these
decisions have made it more difficult to support adolescents as
mature or “adult-like” outside of the context of these cases.36
This difficulty is exacerbated by the existing law, which
provides little protection for children’s autonomy—particularly in
the health care area.
III. THE EXISTING LAW RELATED TO HEALTH CARE DECISION
MAKING: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THE LAW
STAYS THE SAME
The law related to health care decision making, with a few
limited exceptions, treats adolescents as children: vulnerable,
incapable, and in need of protection from their parents.37
Therefore, parents make most minor and major health care
decisions on behalf of their children.38
A few exceptions do exist. Minors may make autonomous
decisions related to the choice whether to have an abortion, an
area protected by federal constitutional law.39 A minor is able to
34

I have been one of those advocates in my prior scholarship. See
generally Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12; see also Jennifer Rosato,
The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child’s View, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362
(2000) [hereinafter Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials]; Rosato, The
Ultimate Test of Autonomy, supra note 5.
35
I have previously criticized the Court for making conclusions relating
to children’s development without relying on the existing scientific or
psychological literature. See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 783–
84.
36
See Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies, supra note 19, at 935–53;
Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 583–85, for a discussion of the
difficulties presented by alternating conceptions of adolescent decision making
abilities.
37
See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
38
See Mutcherson, Whose Body, supra note 12, at 259–63; see also
Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 771–72.
39
See Rachel Rebouche, Parental Involvement Laws and New
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obtain an abortion without parental consent or permission if she
is able to demonstrate to a judge that she is mature or the
abortion is in her best interest.40 Other exceptions to parental
control of health care decisions are narrow and vary state-by41
state. In most states, minors can make decisions based on their
maturity (a “mature minor doctrine”) only in the abortion
context. Some states allow minors to consent when adolescents
achieve a certain status, such as when minors are emancipated
or married.42 Some also allow minors to consent when public
policy (or public health) warrants, such as allowing minors to
consent to treatment of sexually transmitted and other reportable
diseases, care related to drug and alcohol use, and outpatient
mental health services.43 In other areas of health care decision
making, most states do not have laws that protect a minor’s
ability to make a health care decision based on his or her
maturity.44 Moreover, even states recognizing a mature minor
doctrine may limit that right in some significant way by, for
example, extending decision making to consent but not
necessarily refusal of treatment (including life-sustaining
treatment);45 imposing conditions such as those related to
Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 179–88 (2011).
40
See Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 429–32
(2009); see also Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, STATE POLICIES
IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.
41
See Amy T. Campbell, State Regulation of Medical Research with
Children and Adolescents: An Overview and Analysis, in ETHICAL CONDUCT
OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, supra note 17, at app. B at
324.
42
See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 776–78; see also
ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., STATE MINOR CONSENT LAWS: A SUMMARY 3–4
(3d ed. 2010).
43
See ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 4–6.
44
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922
(West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 109.640 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-5-340 (2010); see also Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at
779–81. See generally Campbell, supra note 41, app. B at 347–52 tbl.B.4;
ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 3–6.
45
See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 779–81.
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financial independence and other indicia of emancipation;46
47
limiting the doctrine to a particular context; or requiring
parental participation.48
The reasons undergirding this protective view of children in
the health care context were articulated decades before the
recent adolescent neuroscience research was conducted. In
Bellotti v. Baird,49 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1979, the plurality reasoned that children should be treated
differently because of “the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.”50
An ever-growing body of neuroscience research supports this
differential treatment, even of older adolescents. According to
this research, the adolescent brain functions differently from the
adult brain in important respects, including long-range planning,
risk assessment, and complex decision making involving emotion
51
and cognition. Thus far this research seems to be accepted by
46

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 2004); see also Campbell, supra
note 41, app. B at 325, 347–52 tbl.B.4 (citing states that include
emancipation criteria).
47
See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 780.
48
See id. at 780–81.
49
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
50
Id. at 634; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
(“[P]arents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions . . . . [P]arents . . . act
in the best interests of their children.”).
51
See, e.g., WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 13–19; Laurence
Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 69, 69–71 (2005) [hereinafter Steinberg, Cognitive
Development]; Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 743–44; Steinberg,
Risk Taking, supra note 5. Additional research continues to explore the
differences between adolescents and adults in a variety of contexts. See, e.g.,
Eveline A. Crone et al., Developmental Changes and Individual Differences
in Risk and Perspective-Taking in Adolescence, 20 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1213 (2008); Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in
Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257
(2001); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A
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courts, based on holdings that have allowed adolescents to be
52
treated differently in the criminal justice system.
At the same time, the existence and credibility of the
neuroscience research has created a dilemma for those who
advocate for greater autonomy for children in other areas,
including health care. If the neuroscience research “carries
over” to this context, it would make it difficult to argue that
older adolescents possess the autonomy to make certain health
care decisions. Roper’s Dilemma seems difficult to resolve.53
IV. ROPER’S DILEMMA FOR HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING:
CAN A CHILD BE TREATED AS A CHILD FOR ONE PURPOSE AND
AN ADULT FOR ANOTHER?
Researchers have been studying the maturity of adolescents
in a number of different contexts,54 and their findings suggest
that Roper’s dilemma can be resolved. At least one group of
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003); Berna Güroglu et al., Fairness
Considerations: Increasing Understanding of Intentionality During
Adolescence, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 398 (2009); Anna C.K.
van Duijvenvoorde, Affective and Cognitive Decision-Making in Adolescents,
35 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 539 (2010).
52
See discussion supra Part II.
53
This dilemma may extend into young adulthood as the law’s view of
adolescence (and whether minors are capable) may be increasingly affected
by the greater dependency of young adults on their parents in their early and
mid-twenties. See AFL-CIO WORKING AMERICA, YOUNG WORKERS: A LOST
DECADE 15 (2009); Rich Morin & Wendy Wang, Home for the
Holidays . . . and Every Other Day, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/11/24/home-for-the-holidays-and-everyother-day/; cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg14 (West 2006 & Supp. 3 2009) (requiring covering of young adults under
parents’ health insurance until age 26). This demographic shift not only has
the potential of affecting the overall view of adolescents in society, but also
may diminish their actual decision making capacities, since the
“commonsense reality” is that they probably have had less chance to exercise
their decision making skills before reaching young adulthood.
54
Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 585–86, 593; see also studies
cited supra note 51.
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researchers has concluded that, because adolescents’ capacity to
make decisions varies for different types of decisions, it is
consistent to conclude that adolescents can be deemed incapable
in the Roper and Graham contexts, yet considered capable of
55
making health care decisions. Consequently, in their view, the
APA is not “flip flopping” when it simultaneously advocates
both views of adolescents.56
Based on empirical evidence, these researchers have
distinguished those decisions “that allow for unhurried, logical
reflection and those that do not.”57 Medical decisions fall into
this first category, as well as decisions to participate in clinical
research. As to these kinds of decisions,
where emotional and social influences on judgment are
minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are
consultants who can provide objective information about the
costs and benefits of alternative courses of action,
adolescents are likely to be just as capable of mature
decision making as adults, at least by the time they are 16.58
The researchers conclude that these decisions are primarily
cognitive or intellectual in nature, rather than psychosocial.59
In reaching their conclusions, these researchers emphasize that
science should “inform” rather than “dictate” public policy.60 They
remind judges and advocates (among others) that one competency
standard does not necessarily fit all adolescents, and therefore these
professionals should engage in “a careful and nuanced
consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for
‘adult-like’ maturity in different domains of functioning.”61 These
findings are consistent with an earlier body of research supporting
62
the capacity of older adolescents to make health care decisions.
55

Steinberg, Flip-Flip, supra note 10, at 586–87, 592–93.
Id. at 592–93.
57
Id. at 592.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 586–87, 592–93.
60
Id. at 593.
61
Id.
62
See Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 174 &
nn.119–23, 176 & nn.128 & 131–32 (concluding that adolescents may be
56
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Professionals dealing with these issues need to look beyond
the existing research and consider giving mature minors the right
to make certain health care decisions, depending on the context
in which the decision is made and the competing values
underlying the public policies at stake. The individual variations
in maturity also should be taken into account in the mature
minor determination, which more broadly acknowledges the
volatility and transitional nature of adolescence.
V. MOVING TOWARDS “CONTEXTUAL CAPACITY”
Ultimately, the existing scientific evidence does not (yet)
provide a useful guide for determining whether the law should
recognize that some minors are able to make decisions in the
health care context. Although researchers and commentators
have concluded that such decisions are different from those
facing the juveniles in the Roper and Graham cases,63 this
distinction is not entirely convincing. Some health care decisions
are made with “unhurried, logical reflection”64 but others are
not. Many minors do not consult adults in making these
decisions, but others will.65 Sometimes minors use their
cognitive abilities in making these decisions, and sometimes they
are guided by psychosocial considerations.66 Teenagers may not
competent to consent to research, although more study is necessary); Rosato,
Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 784–85; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae
American Psychological Association in Support of Appellees and CrossAppellants at 6–10, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988)
(No. 86-5423-MN/No. 86-5431-MN), available at http://www.apa.org
/about/offices/ogc/amicus/hodgson.pdf.
63
See supra Part II; see also Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies, supra
note 19, at 952–65.
64
Steinberg, Flip-Flop, supra note 10, at 592.
65
See id. at 586 (pointing to studies indicating that approximately half of
pregnant girls contemplating an abortion do not consult their parents, but do
consult with a nonparental adult other than medical staff).
66
For example, it is possible that teen girls sometimes have babies so
that they will be loved unconditionally or so a boyfriend will stay with them,
and some teens may refuse treatment because of how it will make them look
or to allow them to keep up with their friends. See generally Amanda
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be deliberative in the ways that the researchers assume, and
although some teens are deliberative, others may not be.
More research into neurology and developmental psychology
is needed to provide greater reliability and predictability as to
67
what capacities are needed for particular decisions. This
knowledge will give judges and advocates a better sense of
whether the view of adolescents as incapable in Roper and
Graham should carry over to other areas.
However, even additional scientific evidence may not help
resolve individual cases: consequently, the type of health care
decision and its context will remain important to determining
whether a minor is mature enough to make a particular decision
at a certain time and place.68 Health care decisions range from
abortion, to life-sustaining treatment, vaccinations, antibiotics,
and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Participation in
clinical research is similar to a health care decision, as related
considerations are weighed: the primary distinction is that the
objective of research is to advance knowledge to help others
rather than to improve the individual patient’s health.69 Some of
these decisions require a simple risk/benefit analysis regarding
the efficacy and safety of a particular treatment, but others
require the teenager to grapple with value-laden issues such as
determining the quality of one’s life as a terminally/chronically
ill child, or taking on the major responsibilities of single
parenthood before finishing high school.
Memrick, Surprising Reasons Teens Say They Get Pregnant, GASTON
GAZETTE (May 8, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://www.gastongazette.com/
articles/teens-46910-pregnant-information.html.
67
More studies are being conducted to test capacity in particular
contexts. See studies cited supra note 51.
68
See Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 12; Mutcherson, Whose
Body, supra note 12; Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 795;
Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 747–48.
69
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2010) (defining “research”); see also
Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 157–58 & nn.31–32
(“Underlying those regulatory protections for children are bifurcated aims of
safeguarding minors’ best interests while yielding generalized knowledge
about drug therapies and other medical treatments beneficial to younger age
groups.”).
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All of these reasons lead me to a conclusion that I reached
ten years ago, and of which I have become even more convinced
post-Roper: that mature minors should be able to make some
important health care decisions.70 Specifically, a contextual
capacity doctrine would allow a health care provider to assess
the minor’s maturity and, if appropriate, agree to the minor’s
decision without parental permission or consent.71 This approach
should be privatized, in the sense that it would not require court
intervention in most circumstances.72 For some decisions, such
as refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the court may retain a
limited role as a “safety net” to ensure that the adolescent’s
decision would not threaten his or her life or cause permanent
physical harm.73
Although the limits of this Essay do not allow development
of a detailed approach, it is important to set forth the compelling
public policies that should guide this inquiry and inform
different outcomes depending on the context. One guiding
ethical principle in the health care context is the protection of
the mature minor’s autonomy and bodily integrity. Other
compelling policies in this context include: identity formation,
promoting moral development, parity, and public health.
Consideration of these policies will enable law and policy to
move in a direction that is more principled and coherent.
A. Identity Formation
Where a decision impacts a minor’s formation of his or her
identity, a mature minor should be able to decide on his or her

70

Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 797–803; Rosato, The
Ultimate Test of Autonomy, supra note 5, at 83–103.
71
See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 795–803. Although this
approach varies somewhat from the “categorical, contextual” approach I
proposed in 2002, it seems more feasible, practical, and consistent with the
current cultural, legal, and ethical environment.
72
But see Sanger, supra note 40, at 461–63 (criticizing the determination
of maturity by the courts in the abortion context).
73
Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 799–800.
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own.74 Some decisions, such as whether to choose to have an
abortion or have a child, the refusal of life-sustaining treatment,
or a gender identity change are major life decisions implicating
core values that will affect the quality of a minor’s entire life.
The decision whether to have an abortion or have a child is a
decision to take on the life-long responsibilities of a parent and
to forego the incremental path to independence as a high school
and college student focusing on studies and extracurricular
activities. The decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment is a
decision to choose a certain quality of life over length of life,
and may reflect deeper values such as bodily integrity, dignity,
and core religious tenets. The decision to choose to change
gender identity—to choose to be male or female—is a lifealtering choice especially in a society that places great value on
gender distinctions.
The controversial and important decision regarding the
genetic testing of minors for adult-onset diseases (such as breast
cancer or Alzheimer’s disease) affects a minor’s identity and is
worth highlighting.75 Who should decide whether minors should
be tested for a predisposition to a serious, chronic, or terminal
disease that may not manifest itself until late adulthood (if at
all)?76 This tension becomes a conflict when a parent wants the
74

Id. at 790, 800; see Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open
Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND
STATE POWER 124, 138–51 (William Aiken & Hugh Lafollette, eds., 1980).
To preserve the child’s future, it is important to keep options open that would
be foreclosed in adulthood—such as parenthood, gender identity, and quality
of life.
75
See generally Rhodes, supra note 15; Stephen Robertson & Julian
Savulescu, Is There a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Young
Children?, 15 BIOETHICS 26 (2001) (all sources confronting the issue of
predictive genetic testing in young children); Benjamin Wilfond & Lainie
Friedman Ross, From Genetics to Genomics: Ethics, Policy and Parental
Decision-Making, 34 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 639 (2009).
76
For a discussion of this issue, see Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra
note 15; Rhodes, supra note 15; Robertson & Savulescu, supra note 75;
Wilfond & Ross, supra note 75; see also Beth N. Peshkin et al., Brief
Assessment of Parents’ Attitudes Toward Testing Minor Children for
Hereditary Breast/Ovarian Cancer Genes: Development and Validation of the
Pediatric BRCA ½ Testing Attitudes Scale (P-TAS), 34 J. PEDIATRIC
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minor to be tested and the minor wants to refuse the testing:
should he or she be able to veto the parents’ decision and
prevent the violation of bodily integrity and breach of privacy?77
The implications of the testing and the knowledge gained from it
implicate core values and may affect the quality of the minor’s
entire life. For example, the testing and knowledge may have
psychological effects, as an individual will need to deal with the
anxiety and related emotions that may be caused by the acquired
knowledge of one’s predisposition to a serious disease that may
already have caused death in the family.78 It also may affect the
health care received (including further testing and other
surveillance), childbearing decisions, and other “life planning.”79
For all of these reasons, this testing decision is identity-forming
and mature minors need to be able to participate significantly in the
80
decision. At a minimum, minors with capacity to make this health
care decision should be able to veto the parents’ decision to compel
testing and knowledge acquisition. The mature minor should be
able to guide the quality of his or her life, and make a decision to
test when he or she is ready in all respects.81
PSYCHOL. 627, 628 (2009).
77
See Anne Marie Laberge & Wylie Burke, Testing Minors for Breast
Cancer, 9 VIRTUAL MENTOR 6, 8 (2007) (discussing the potential
consequences of honoring autonomous parental decisions).
78
See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra note 15, at 1233, 1235–
36; Rhodes, supra note 15, at 612–15; Robertson & Savulescu, supra note
75, at 34, 45.
79
See Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, supra note 15, at 1233–37; cf.
Angela Bradbury et al., Should Genetic Testing for BRCA ½ be Permitted for
Minors? Opinions of BRCA Mutation Carriers and Their Adult Offspring,
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 70, 74 (2008) (providing evidence that the most
common reason to support testing was to foster healthy behavior in minors,
and in parents encouraging minors’ healthy behavior).
80
See Robertson & Savulescu, supra note 75, at 40 (“Learning to
become autonomous requires actually making important decisions for oneself
about oneself, and one such decision might be whether to know some fact
about one’s genetic make-up.”); see also Bradbury et al., supra note 79, at
76 (“Given that some individuals achieve social, emotional and intellectual
maturity well in advance of their peers, it may be permissible to allow
genetic testing of minors on a case-by-case basis.”).
81
See Peshkin et al., supra note 76, at 628 (citing, inter alia, Am. Coll.
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B. Promoting Moral Development
Respecting mature minors’ decisions in certain health care
decisions not only will allow them to chart their own futures, but
also assist in developing independent decision-making skills and
promoting moral development. One such type of decision is
giving informed consent to research. Allowing mature minors to
consent to nontherapeutic research will encourage them to develop
values such as altruism, as well as to better assess the risks and
benefits of a clinical trial.82
In 2004, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) issued a
comprehensive report relating to children’s participation in
research trials, which furthers this model of decision making for
adolescents:
Institutional review boards should consider granting
waivers of parental permission for adolescent participation
in research when
 the research is important to the health and wellbeing of adolescents and it cannot reasonably or
practically be carried out without the waiver. . . or
 the research involves treatments that state laws
permit adolescents to receive without parental
permission (consistent with the definition of
children in the [federal regulations]);
of Med. Genetics, supra note 15; Bradbury et al., supra note 79) (discussing
case-by-case approach, considering minor’s maturity).
82
See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 7; cf.
Rhonda Gay Hartman, Gault’s Legacy: Dignity, Due Process and
Adolescents’ Liberty Interests in Living Donation, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 67, 103–06 (2008) (furthering similar values in organ
donation context); Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at
169–70 (crediting the numerous benefits of autonomous decisions to
participate in research); Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials, supra note 34,
at 370 (stating that empowerment of mature minors “would lead to a number
of desirable results, including adolescents being more informed about these
decisions; being allowed to practice decision making before formal adulthood
begins, thus permitting them to become better decision makers in adulthood;
and being able to play a role in shaping their own identities, including their
desire to be beneficent.”).
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and when
 the investigator has presented evidence that the
adolescents are capable of understanding the
research and their rights as research participants
and
 the research protocol includes appropriate
safeguards to protect the interests of the
adolescent consistent with the risk presented by
83
the research.
The policy should not be limited to treatments that state laws
permit adolescents to receive without parental permission, since
those laws may be limited.84 Also, the standard should clearly
allow mature minors to consent to nontherapeutic research if it
poses only a minimal risk.85
This approach appropriately balances the relevant public
policies, including respect for the child’s bodily integrity,
autonomy, and dignity; protection of the child’s health; and the
societal benefit of the knowledge gained through the research.
As an additional benefit, allowing minors to make these kinds of
decisions may also enable them to accelerate their brain
development, since there is support for the conclusion that
greater use of their decision-making capacities may increase
those capacities.86
83

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 19; accord
Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 197–99 (advocating
for legal reform and further research consistent with the IOM’s
recommendations); Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 800–01
(proposing similar approach).
84
See supra Part II.
85
See Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials, supra note 34, at 370–71. In
the federal regulations, “minimal risk” is defined as “the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in
and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.” 45
C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(k) (2011); see also INST. OF
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 17, at 117–36 (discussing
interpretations of minimal risk and recommendations related to risk).
86
See Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note 12, at 792–93; see also
Steinberg, Cognitive Development, supra note 51, at 71 (“Performance in
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C. Parity

Similar kinds of decisions should be regarded as similar so
that the minor’s autonomy is truly respected. For example, an
adolescent who becomes a parent should be able to make health
care decisions for herself and for her child;87 and a minor who
makes decisions regarding sexually transmitted diseases should
be able to consent to the HPV vaccine, which prevents certain
cancers caused by the Human Papillomavirus.88
Access to the HPV vaccine is a cutting-edge issue that
illustrates an existing lack of parity among decisions related to
sexually transmitted diseases. Adolescents seek the HPV vaccine
and may not be able to get it, and other adolescents who need it
may not know about the vaccine or how to ask for it.89
Furthermore, it is unclear whether state laws allow this decision to
be made without notifying or seeking the consent of a parent, even if
the law allows for treatment of STDs.90 If the vaccine is considered
general health care, parental involvement is required. Under this
paradigm, without parity, a sexually active teen can get a pregnancy
everyday settings are likely affected by emotional states, social influences and
expertise.”); cf. Hartman, Word from the Academies, supra note 17, at 169–
70 (developing cognitive abilities, improving self-image, enhancing sense of
identity and accomplishment). See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACAD., supra note 17, at 179 (cognitive development depends in part on
experience and training).
87
For a discussion of this issue, see Rosato, Let’s Get Real, supra note
12, at 777–78.
88
See sources cited supra note 14.
89
See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 435–36; Ford et al., supra note
14, at 570–71; Saribel G. Ceballos, HPV Vaccination for Adolescents; An
Ethics Case Study, ADVANCE FOR NPS & PAS, Oct. 26, 2009, at 31,
available at http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb.
com/Article/HPV-Vaccination-for-Adolescents.aspx; Cynthia S. Marietta,
High Incidence of HPV in Minors Spotlights Need for State Legislators to
Consider Amending Child “Consent to Treatment” Laws, HEALTH L. PERSP.
6 (May 21, 2010, 8:23 AM), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/
2010/(CM)%20HPV.pdf.
90
See English et al., supra note 14, at S86–87; Ford et al., supra note
14, at 570. A few state laws appear to allow minor consent to vaccination.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
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test or whatever medication is necessary to treat a sexually
transmitted disease, but cannot get a vaccination to prevent some of
the most serious, long-term health consequences of contracting one
of the most prevalent sexually transmitted diseases.91
The HPV vaccine should be given without the need for
parental consent or permission, as it should be regarded as a
decision involving the transmission of sexually transmitted
92
diseases. State laws should be changed to allow minors to
consent to this treatment, which affects their long-term health, in
determining whether it will increase the probability of serious
conditions.93 In addition, parental consent waivers to treatment
should clearly include preventative treatment such as
vaccinations.94 Preserving this parity with STD treatment will
best protect the minor’s autonomy and health.
D. Public Health
The law has given some deference to minors in areas
implicating public health concerns. These areas of decision
making include mental health, drug and alcohol treatment, birth
control, and treatment for STDs.95 These areas address a number
of important public health concerns, including preventing the
91

See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436; Marietta, supra note 89,
at 6–7; cf. English et al., supra note 14, at S87 (describing how laws could
include vaccinations).
92
See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436.
93
For example, a state could enact a law that allows minors to consent to
vaccination as health care related to the prevention of STDs. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 90-21.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); see also S. 4779, 231st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bill/S4779-2009 (the language of the bill reads, “A health care practitioner
may provide health care related to the prevention of a sexually transmissible
disease, including administering vaccines, to a person under the age of
eighteen years without the consent or knowledge of the parents or guardians
of such person, provided that the person has capacity to consent to the care,
without regard to the person’s age, and the person consents.”).
94
See Ford et al., supra note 14, at 572–73.
95
See supra Part III. The area of decisional autonomy may also include
the HPV vaccination. See Farrell & Rome, supra note 14, at 436–37.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

188

spread of communicable diseases and ensuring that the minor
obtains needed treatment to prevent serious harm to herself or to
others. In these contexts, the safety of the minor and the
community is more important than ensuring that parents know
96
about or are involved in the decisions. For example, we do not
want to deter teens from obtaining medication to treat an STD
because they do not want to tell their parents they have been
sexually active (probably without protection) and caught a disease
as a result.
Although these areas of decision-making authority are already
recognized by most states,97 they should be expanded as necessary
to protect against the dangers that teenagers pose to themselves
and to others.98 For example, as discussed above, the minors’
right to obtain treatment for STDs should include the right to
consent to the HPV vaccine. In addition, statutes relating to
minors’ consent to mental health treatment need to better reflect
the reality of their lives, including the deterrent effect that
parental involvement may have on seeking needed treatment. A
recent California mental health statute99 seems to go only halfway:
it recognizes a mature minor doctrine for outpatient mental health
services,100 but then requires that a parent or guardian be involved
unless the involvement would be “inappropriate” and requires
parental contact to be recorded.101 True autonomy for minors
considered mature should not require parental involvement or
proof that it is inappropriate. The fact that the mature minor is
seeking mental health treatment on his or her own without an
96

See Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, supra note 51, at 271–72
(suggesting treatment for STDs despite adolescents’ immaturity).
97
See supra Part II.
98
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West Supp. 2011) (adopting
mature minor doctrine, but significantly limiting it with requirement of
parental involvement).
99
Id.
100
Id. See generally Sana Loue, Faith-Based Mental Health Treatment of
Minors, 31 J. LEGAL. MED. 171, 195 (2010) (“A number of states . . . currently
provide for minors’ access to mental health services absent parental consent
and notification, subject to various restrictions relating to the nature and
duration of treatment.”).
101
Loue, supra note 100.
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adult involved should be enough of an indication that the minor
would not desire nor benefit from consultation with a parent.
Recognizing these compelling public policies and “privatizing”
the law as much as possible would only build respect for the
adolescents’ dignity and right to self-determination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent scientific literature on adolescent brain
development should not dictate the development of the law,102
even if it is consistent with the “commonsense reality” that teens
have a lot of growing up to do. We know teenagers who are as
capable, or more capable, than some adults. Even as teens, they
raise healthy children, have successful careers, and make other
important decisions on their own. For those minors who are
deemed mature enough to make a decision in a particular
context, compelling pubic policies suggest that we should give
their voices recognition, and give their choices the dignity and
respect that they deserve.103
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Steinberg, Public Policy, supra note 9, at 746–48.
See Hartman, supra note 82 (proposing that, consistent with Gault,
minors should be allowed to consent to organ donation to protect their
dignity); cf. Sanger, supra note 40 (arguing that abortion bypass hearings fail
to respect the dignity of minors).
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